Despite claiming that his preeminent trade policy would shrink America’s export gap with the rest of the world, President Donald Trump’s tariffs haven’t managed to rebalance trade or prompt a reshoring renaissance.
In fact, an analysis of first-half 2026 trade and manufacturing data conducted by Rethink Trade, a program under the American Economic Liberties Project, revealed that the U.S. manufactured goods trade deficit is 5 percent wider than before the president took office for a second term.
While Trump campaigned on a promise that tariffs on foreign imports would drive more purchases of American-made goods, the truth has been much more complicated.
Since taking the oath of office in January 2025, the U.S. has shed 75,000 manufacturing jobs, and there’s been little evidence to show that companies are laying the foundation for a comeback, as construction spending on manufacturing facilities also declined by 30 percent during that period.
According to data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the manufactured goods trade deficit amounted to $785 billion in the first half of 2026—15 percent smaller than the first half of 2025, but higher than the first six months of 2024, as well as the first-half deficits seen from 2015 to 2021.
Rethink Trade director Lori Wallach cautioned against viewing the first-half 2025-to-2026 contraction in the deficit as an all-out win, given that there were special circumstances that precipitated it. Importers were rushing to get inventory into the country during the first three months of the year before Trump’s tariffs took effect—but after that period, the overall U.S. manufactured goods trade deficit jumped by $63 billion in 2025 compared to the previous year, she said.
In looking at the goods trade deficit, which contracted to $545 billion in the first half of 2026 (compared to $750 billion in the first half of 2025 and $603 billion in the first half of 2024), there are also telling signs that the apparent wins may not be what they seem.
For one: most of the gains stemming from goods exports weren’t related to manufacturing output—they were driven by commodities: gold, silver, oil and gas, as well as aircrafts. When it comes to the metals, a large share are re-exports of products that weren’t mined in the U.S., and that’s a sign that the flows are driven more by capital movements than bona fide goods trade.
Wallach put it succinctly. “The whole global economy is a little bit unstable because he”—Trump—”changes his mind every 30 seconds and started a war with Iran. And so you know what do people do? They rush to silver and gold. And so, we’re selling basically the economic security blanket metals as bulk ores (that there’s new demand for because Trump has destabilized the global economy), and then we’re selling oil and gas because the Iran War has basically undermined other supply chains of those things,” she said.
“Trump has caused temporary disruption, and so we’re getting a temporary boom related to this behavior that is also causing major downsides,” she added. “The promised renaissance is not happening because you would not have a net decline in manufacturing jobs since Trump returned to office. You would not have a manufacturing trade deficit that is higher than it was before he was inaugurated for the second term.”
In Wallach’s estimation, using tariffs to prompt reshoring would take a much more nuanced and comprehensive approach than the one the Trump administration has employed thus far. Tariffs should have been a single building block propping up the president’s trade and economic strategy, not the entire structure.
In addition to applying tariffs more surgically, Wallach said the administration should have helped build demand for American-made products through policies—tax incentives for consumers who purchase domestically made goods, for example, and requirements for domestic procurement by the federal government.
On the investment side, she said, the government should have offered subsidies for companies hoping to reshore, “because as well as creating demand for the goods and protecting the sectors not to be surged to death once you are getting the demand, you also need to basically incentivize the investment.”
Wallach pointed to the end of the Inflation Reduction Act subsidies put in place by President Joe Biden as a possible factor in the decline in factory construction. “The most recent peak in the past 15 years of manufacturing employment was the first quarter of 2023, and that is when all of that money was flowing,” she said.
Biden used tariffs in conjunction with subsidies, she added, pointing to duties on China for electric vehicles and heightened tariffs on solar products. The combination of strategically applied tariffs on specific industries and the subsidies and tax breaks for American makers “was working together hand in glove,” she said.
The way the current administration is leveraging tariffs, by contrast, amounts to throwing down a few puzzle pieces and hoping to build a full picture of a robust trade economy. According to Wallach’s research, the new data underscores “what public opinion polls are already capturing.”
“We have a growing gap between the economy Trump promised and the damage his tariff malpractice is causing.” she said.
